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t. I nt rod uction

A fundamental question in the theory of decision processes is whether decision
rules (strategies) which depend only on the current state or only on the current time
and state yield as high rewards as strategies which take the whole past into account.
For many types of objective functions such as average reward payofIs, the first type
of strategy (called stationary) is often much inferior to more general strategies,
whereas for most common objective functions the second type (called Markov
strategies) have been found to be as good as general strategies (cf. [I, 3, 5,7,8,10,
II, 13, 14, 17,21]).
The main purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of good Markov strategies
for a large class of objective functions which includes product and lim inf payoffs
as well as practically all of the classical dynamic programming expected payoff
functions. One of the key new ideas is the use of a randomized Markov strategy
which depends not only on a given non-randomized strategy, but on the (product)
reward function as well, in contrast to the usual randomized Markov average which
depends only on the original strategy (7, 8, II, 14, 19].

This paper is organized as follows: Section :2 contains the preliminary definitions
and averaging results; Section 3 contains the definition of product-reward dependent
randomized Markov strategies, and their application in establishing the existence
of good randomized Markov strategies in a large class of objective functions 1V;
Section 4 establishes the existence of good non-randomized Markov strategies in
'11"'; and Section 5 establishes the existence of good (non-randomized) Markov
strategies for the expected lim inf reward criterion.

2. Countable-state decision processes and randomized strategies
A countable-state decision process is a pair (X, r), where X is a countable set and
r associates to each point x in X a non-empty collection rex) of probability
measures on X. (In classical dynamic programming terminology, X represents the
state space and rex) the actions available at x; in the gambling theory terminology
of Dubins and Savage [6] (upon which most of the notation used in this paper is
based), (X, r) is simply a gambling house with a countable number of fortunes and
countably-additive gambles). A strategy is a function from the finite sequences in

X (including the empty sequence "0") to the probability measures on X, and the
same symbol. (T. will be used to denote both a strategy and the probability measurc
it generates on the Borel product sigma-algebra ~ X' on X X' (X endowcd with the
discrete topology). A strategy if in r at x is a strategy such that (T(H) E rex) and
(T(X t , • ••• x,,) E 1'(x,,) for all XI." '. X" E X and all n ~ 1. A strategy (T is Markot'
[10] if (T(.\"t ..... X,,)=(T(X; .... ,x;,) whenever x~=xn, and is Jtationary if
(T(X I , . •. ,x,,) = (T(X; • .•. ,x;") whenever x;" = X". The conditional strategy given
XI' ... , X"' (F[X t , .•• , x,,], is defined by
(T[X I , •• . ,

xn](x;, ... , x;,,)

= (T(X"

•. . ,Xn,

x;, . .. , x:,,).

X" denotes the state of the process at time n and can be regarded as the
nth-coordinate projection map on X'x,. Thus X" is a random variable on the
probability space (X""", Be"", (F). In addition, S(x) denotes the Dirac delta measure
at x, and fA the indicator function of the set A.

Definition 2.1. The discrete randomized closure of I~

i\X)={~ P,Y,:YiEI'(X),p,>o,f
j ~

t I:

I

I ~

I

t, is the function

p,=t}.

Thus
~ and in general the gambler has more strategies available in P than
in I~ namely the "randomized averages" of his originally available strategies. One
may think of constructing a strategy in t· by use of independent lotteries: when one
is at state x, he may select the lottery (i.e. the {p;}) of his choice, and use that lottery
to detcrmine which gamble in r(x) he selects (see the proof of Proposition 2.2).
Clearly I"(x) is convex for all x, and in general is strictly larger than the convex
hull of rex).

The first proposition in this section says that every Markov strategy a in f may
be expressed as an average (expected value) of Markov strategies in T. Aside from
some notational differences, the proposition is similar to theorems of Krylov [14,
Theorem 1] and Fainberg [7, Theorem 1]. Because of the changes in notation, a
proof is provided here.

Proposition 2.2. Let a be a strategy in f at x. Then there exists a probability triple
(n, sI, J.L) and a collection of strategies {(Tw: WEn} in T at x satisfring

a(B)=
Moreover,

if a

f

is a

O"w(B)dJ.L(w)
~farkov

forallBin9JJ"'.

(2.1)

strategy, then {O"w: WEn} can be chosen to be Markov.

a

Proof. The argument will be provided for the case where is Markov; the demonstra
tion in the non-Markov case is essentially the same. Fix a Markov strategy a in
at x. and without loss of generality let X = {I, 2, 3, ...}. Enlarging the underlying
probability space if necessary, embed the "state process" X = (Xl' X 2 , X J , ••• ) in
a larger process (Xl, Y., X 2 • Y 2 •••• ) where: the conditional distribution of Y i given
XI, Y., ... , Y, - t , Xi is uniform on [0, I) (so the {Y are i.i.d. uniform [0, I), and
Y, is independent of XI> ... , X,); and the conditional distribution of X, <I given
X., Y1 , ••• , Xi, Yi is 'Y'.;.k on the set

t

j }

{Xi

where

=J} (") {Y E [a,.,.k"

L;"'I Pi.i.k 'Yi.i.k

j

ai.i.dL

is the gamble in

r which CT uses if in state J at time i, and

a i.i.k = Pi.i,l + ... + Pi.l.k·

°

(Recall that both P',I.k > and 'Yi.J,k E J'(j) for all i, J, k.) Observe that the distrihution
of X in the embedded process is the same as the distribution of X under the strategy
cT, that is, P(XE8)=cJ(8) for all LJE01', Since the random vectors X and
Y = (Y1 , Y 2 , ••• ) take values in Borel spaces, it follows [2, Theorem 4.34] that there
exists a regular conditional distribution for X given Y. That is, there is a function
0'1 ,,( • ) on [0, 1) ", x @" such that for fixed wE [0, l) X', u", ( , ) is a probability measure
on (XC, @"), and for fixed 8 E 88 "', 0'(,)( 8) is a version of P(X E B I Y). Moreover,
for each w there is a natural Markov strategy O'w in
at x associated with the
measure 0'w; if W = (r, , r 2 , ••• ) then o"w is the strategy which in state J at time i uses
'Y,.J,,,Er(j), where k is determined by a,.i.,,_,~rJ<ai,i,'" Let
be [0, 1)"',:.1 the
product-Borel sigma algebra, and J.L the product of countably many copies of
Lebesgue measure on [0, 1). The conclusion (2.1) then follows, since

r

n

cJ(8)=P(XEB)=

f

p(XE:BIY)dP}.=

f

0'",(8)dJ.L(w).

0

In contrast to the conclusion of Proposition 2.2 pertaining to Markov strategies,
it is not always possible to write a stationary strategy in j'- as the average of stationary
strategies in r

Example 2.3. Let X == {a. b. c}; let r(a) == {c5(b), c5(c)}, and r(b) == r(c) == c5(a). Let
a be the stationary strategy in f at b which uses (c5 (b) + e5 (c) )/2 always at state
a", and let B == {X z == b and X~ == d. Then a( B) == L but a( B) == 0 for all (i.e. both)
stationary strategies a in
at b.
H

r

Proposition 2.4. Let a be a strategy in f at x, and let I : X x- -.!R be measluable and
a-integrable (i.e. f II Ida < 00). Then there exist strategies a l and U~ in r at x with

!vloreol'er, il a is Markov, then

U1

and

Uz

can be chosen

to

be Markov.

Proof. By Proposition 2.2 there is a probability space (f1, s1, J1.) and a collection of
(Markov) strategies {u,J in r at x satisfying (2.1). It then follows routinely (for
indicator functions, then for simple functions, then for limits of simple functions)
using the dominated convergence theorem that

Since jJ. is a prohability measure, this even implies there is a set of w of positive
0
J1.-measure for which f f drT", ?- f I dlT.
An immediate corollary to Proposition 2.4 is that in decision processes with
bounded payolTs j: one may do just as weU with non-randomized (pure) strategies
as with randomized ones.
Corollary 2.5. Let I: X'''' -!R be bounded and measurable. Then
(i)

sup{f Id,r: a in

(ii)

in f

{f 1 d

IT:

r

at x} ==sup{f IdcT:

a in rat x } == in f

Equality is not always attainable
following easy example shows.

In

a in

t

at

{f 1 d IT: a in tat

X},

and

X }.

the conclusion of Proposition 2.4, as the

Example 2.6. Let X == {a, b, d; let l'(a) == {B(b), c5(c)}, r(b) == {e5(b)}, and I'(c) ==
{B(c)}; and define 1 by l(x l , X2'" .) == I if Xl == b, and == 0 otherwise. If a is the
stationary strategy in
at "a" given by aW)==(e5(b)+e5(c»/2, then f/da-==L but
ffdlT==O or I for all a in l:

t

3. Randomized Markov strategies
Assume that (X, F) is a countable-state decision process.
Definition 3.1. For each positive integer n, let rn be a non-negative real-valued
function with domain X and let Y r be the collection of all strategies in
Let "11'-1
be the set of all functions WI: Y r -+ [-00, +00] = iR which are of the form

r.

and let "11"2 be the set of all functions w:: Y r
w:(u)

=

g(

-+ [ -

00, + 00] of the form

E,,[r1(X.)], Eu[r.(XI)r:(X:)],.,.,

E"C~I 1j(X

j )

J. ...),

(iR+)-X:' and taking values in iR. Let

where g is any function having domain
be denoted by "W".

"'W. u '11-:

Thus "11'1 consists of those payoff functions which depend only on expected
one-stage rewards, while "'W: includes those payoffs which depend on successive
expected product rewards.
The following example lists some typical functions in 'W, both some standard
dynamic programming objectives and several non-standard ones.

Example 3.2. (a) total reward. Then

WE

"IV., where

(In particular, if f3>O and r,,=f3 n - 1 r, then w(u) is "total discounted reward"; if
= 0 for n ~ N, w(u) is "total finite horizon reward",)
(b) average reward. Then WE WI, where

'n

w(u)

=

li~c~p ~ E"Lt. r)(X)

J.

(c) exponential (product) reward. Then
w(u)

= !~~ exp

"IV., where

EtJ'[il rj(Xj )] = !~~ ill exp E,,[rj(Xj )].

(d) supremum reward. Then
w(u)

WE

WE

"IV., where

= sup E"r"(X").
"

(e) average periodic reward. Let p be a positive integer. Then

WE

"'WI, where

(In particular, if p = I, then w(O") is "lim sup reward".)
(f) expected product reward. Then w E 'Jr~, where
w(O")

=:

li~!~p E [j0, rj(X)
CT

l'

(In particular, if A c X and r n =: 1-\ for each n, then w( a-) is the probability of
staying in A forever.)
(g) maximum deviation. If p is a constant. then WE '11',. where
w(a-)

=:

pl.

limsupl E.,[r,,(X,,)] n--X'

(h) maximum variation (in expected performance). Then

w( 0")

=:

sup I ma x E..[ rJ ( X, )] - mi n E" [ rJ ( X j

n-X"

J~"

)

WE

'11'., where

I,

)~n

Two objective functions which are not in 11' are the classical gambling-theoretic
payoff w( a-) = E.. [limsup" _ ,.r( X,,)], and the product reward payoff w( a-) =
E..[r( Xl) . r( X~) . r( X.\)] for the case where r may take negative and positive values.
The question of adequacy of Markov strategies for the gambling-theoretic payoff is
answered aflirmatively, if X is finite. in Hill [10]; for the product reward problem,
Markov strategies arc not in general adequate (Example 3.7 below).
As preparation for the fundamental defInition of product-dependent randomized
Markov strategy, some notation is needed. For each positive integer n, let r,,: X -Ill
be a non-negative function and let IT be a strategy. If q = (x" X~, . .. ,x,,) is a sequence
(or partial history) of length n in X, let ~«(T, q) denote the product

r, ( XI) r 2 (.~ 2)

• • •

r" ( X" ) I~, (.X',

=X I ,

X 2 = X 2,

• • • ,

X"

= x" ).

That is,

~(IT, lJ) ::: ['1\ ',(x/) }T(0)( {XI})
x IT(X,)({X1})IT('\·IX1)({Xl})·· . £T(X I X2 ' .. x,,_,)({X,,}).

It is easy to see that

E.. [

,(II '/ (XI )] = ,}=x" ~ «(T, lJ)·

Definition 3.3. The product-dependent randomi::ed Markov strategy for the strategy
(T and the rewards r l , r1, r.\, . . . is the strategy a constructed as follows: let (;(0) =:
aWL and for each x in X, let (T(X) = u(x). For any partial history q of length n
such that n> 1 and lJ" = x", let
~(IT, px" ) (T ( pX" )

'>,"
""

IT(

p' :\,.

q)

I

=: :"---\,,-.- - - - - 

~(IT.

f"

,\-" ,

pX,,)

if

~(lr,px,,»O,

y
p' \-"

I

and
u(q) = u(x,,)

if ~(u, px,,) = 0 for each p E X,,-I.

u

Notice that the transition probability (gamble) that
uses at x" is a mixture of
gambles that u uses at x", weighted with respect to the products ~(u, px"). The
assumption that each 'j is non-negative guarantees that u( q) ~ O. In the case where
~(u, px,,) = 0 for each p E X"-t, the definition of u(q) is rather arbitrary; u(x,,) was
chosen for convenience to ensure that
is Markov and in f.

u

Remark. In the special case where '" == 1 for each n, the strategy
3.3 has the property that

u in

Definition

U(X"+IEGlx,,=x)=U(X"+IEGlx,,=x)

(3.1)

for each subset G of X, each positive integer n, and each x E X. Such a randomized
Markov average
has been used often in the literature of dynamic programming.
(For example, see Fainberg [7,8], or Strauch [19]).

u

The product-dependent randomized Markov strategy
reward as the original strategy u. as seen below:

u yields the same product

Proposition 3.4. If (T is a strategy, ',,: X -IR is a non-negative function for each n,
and if cT is the product dependent randomized Markov strategy for (T and rl ,
r J •••••
then for each positive integer n,

,!.

E"

[(I
)~

rj ( X j ) ] = E ,I'

[(I

r) ( X j ) ] •

(3.2)

I-I

1

Proof. It follows from Definition 3.3 (since II" x" I ~«(F. px,,) = 0 if and only if each
summand is zero) that for all n ~ 1, all x" E X, and all q E X" such that q" = x"'
u(q)

I

I' •.~X"-I

~(u, px,,)

= I

~(u, px,,)a(px,,).

pte.\'''

(3.3 )

I

The plan is to show by induction that for all n ~ 2,

I

~(a, q)u(q) =

qt:X"-1

I

~(u, q)a(q).

(3.4)

C/t: .., \"-I

Then, evaluating each side of the measure equality (3.4) at (X" = xn), multiplying
both sides by," (x,,), and summing over all x" in X, the desired equality (3.2) will
be obtained for alLn ~ 2.
To prove (3.4) for n = 2, observe that for each x in X,
~(u, x)

= ,.(x)a(0)({x}) = 'l(x)o-(0)({x}) = ~(o-, x).

For the induction step, calculate as follows:

</.:Lx. ~«(T,

q)u(q)

= .~"~x [po:t--. ~(u, PX,,)U(PXn )]

=~"~x [pC~_-1 ~(u, px")cJ(px")]

using (3.3) and observing that 0-( px,,) does not depend on p. Then. with aid of the
induction hypothesis,

'1E~M ~(a. q)a(q) =~M~X r"(X"{PEtM_' ~(a, p)a(p)({x,,})o-(PX,,)]

=~M~X r"(X"{p<:~M_' ~(a-'P)a-(P)({X,,})a-(PX,,)]
=

~ ~(a-, q)o-(q),
x"

'I':

and (3.4) is proved; the relation (3.2) follows, as long as
n = I, (3.2) holds because o-(~)) = a(U). 0

n?:

2. For the case where

The following theorem, the main result in this section, guarantees the existence
of good randomi::ed Markov strategies for all countable-state decision processes
with objective function in cWo It will also serve as a stepping stone to Theorem 4.2,
which asserts the existence of good non-randomi:ed Markov strategies for many of
the objective functions in '1t·.
Theorem 3.5. Let (X, r) he a cOlUltah/e-state decision process, and suppose IV E '11'.
Then for cac" x E X ami each rT in
at x. t"ere is a randomi:ed Markov .'itrate~y /;
in
at x wit" w( (I-) ~ w( (T).

r

t

r

I)roof. Let x E X and let (T he in
at x. In case WE 'U"" let CT be the randomized
Markov strategy described in the remark following Definition 3.3. The relation (3.1)

guarantees that

EAr" ( X" )] = E" [ r" ( X" )]

(3.5)

for each II?: I, and hence that w(rF) = w(rT), proving the theorem. In case wE 'U·~,
let CT be the product-dependent randomized Markov strategy for (T and r l , r~, r\, ....
The proof is completed by applying Proposition 3.4. 0
Remarks. The portion of Theorem 3.5 which pertains to cJr l is a special case of
results of Derman and Strauch [5, Theorem 2] and of Hordijk [11. Theorem 13.2]'
In Delinition 3.1, each function r" was assumed non-negative, and in the case
where W E 'JV~, the proof of Theorem 3.5 did use this assumption. However, in the
case where WE 'WI' the only purpose of the hypothesis r" ?: 0 was to guarantee the
existence of each expectation E,,[ r,,( X,,)]. Thus for the 'WI case, the non-negativity
assumption on r" may be weakened.
Actually, in the 'WI case, the proof of Theorem 3.5 depended only upon the fact
that the distributions of X" under (T and (T are the same, and not upon the integrals
in (3.5). Therefore its conclusion would hold for a much larger class than 'JV.,
specifically, objective functions which depend only on the distributions of the

random variables, such as functions of the medians, supports, or variances. But for
the application of this theorem in the proof of the existence of good non-randomized
Markov strategies (Theorem 4.4), integration (via averages of probability measures
and Fatou's Lemma) plays an important role.
The 'Wt case of Theorem 3.5 could also be extended to reward functions of the
form r"(X,,, X,,+I), since the distribution of (X", X" +I ) is the same under a as under
the
described in (3.1). Even further, the reward could depend on the gamble or
action as well. with rewards of the form r"(X", 'Y, X"+t). Such reward functions
have been investigated before (cf. Ornstein [15] or Schal and Sudderth [18]).
This section concludes with three examples of decision processes where the payoff
functions are not in ,:OW, and where, in contrast to the setting of Theorem 3.5, there
are non-Markov strategies in r which yield substantially larger payoffs than any
Markov strategies in f. In the first example, the payoff is the expected maximum
reward over times 1,2, and 3 (recall the maximum expected reward 3.2(d) is in lV).
In the second example, the payoff is the product of rewards over times 1,2. and 3,
but negative rewards are allowed. The third example shows that it is not possible
to extend Theorem 3.5 to include payon functions w which can be written as a sum
of two payoffs, one from 11~t and one from W~.

a

Example 3.6. Let X={a,b,c,d,e}~ rl=r~='-l=r, where r(a)=r(c)=r(d)=O,
r ( b) = 5, r( e) = 10;
a ) = 0 <5 ( b ) + ~ /5 ( c) l. r ( b) = r (c) = r ( e ) = { (5 ( d ) l. and r (d) =
{/5(bL'Yl. where 'Y=.~8(e)+~8(a); and w(cr)=E,,[max{r(X 1 ).r(X 2 ).r(X.1 )}). Let
CT.., be any strategy in r at "a" which. when in state d at time 2. uses 'Y if XI = b
and uses il(b) if XI = c. (That is. cT,,(b, d) = 'Y and cr..,(c, d) = (5(b». It is easily
verified that w(cr,d = '~\ while for any Markov strategy (T in
at "a", w«(1-) = 5.

n

t

Example 3.7. Let X = {a, b. c, d, e.f}, and r l = r1 = '-1 = r, where r(a) = r(b) = r(eI) =
r(e)=+I, and r(c)=r(f)=-1. Let r(a)=gD(b)+~o(c)}. l'(b)=J'(c)=r(e)=
nf) = {J5(d)}, and J'(d) = {o(e), o(f)}. Define the expected product reward objec
tive by W(iT) = E.,[r(Xd· r(X 1)· r(X.1 )] for (FE Y/" If CT" is a strategy in r at "a"
such that er,,(b, d) = cS(e) and erA(£:, el) = o(f), then w(er A ) = + I, but for any Markov
strategy a in l' at "a", w(u) = O.
Example 3.8. Let (X, r) be as in Example 3.6, let r\ = r 2 = r~ = r-4 = r, where r(a) =
r(c) = 0, r(b) = r(d) = I, r(e) = 5, and let w(a) = E,,[r(X 1 ) • r(X 1) . r(X 3 )] +
E.,[r(X-4)]. A calculation shows that for the non-Markov strategy (TI' defined in
Example 3.6, w(er,,) = L while for any Markov strategy a in
at "a", w(o-) ~ 1.5.

t

If the reward functions r tl are non-negative, then the expected product reward
objective w lies in 'W (Example 3.2(f», and by Theorem 3.5, good randomized
Markov strategies do exist. It follows from Theorem 4.2 in the next section that
even good non-randomized Markov strategies exist for such an objective.

Denardo and Rothblum [4] use linear programming to compute optimal policies
for problems which have exponential utility functions and which satisfy certain
transience conditions. In [12] and [13], Kreps studies the existence of optimal
(non-Markov) strategies in problems with finite action spaces and general objective
functions and the existence of good strategies which are Markov or stationary with
respect to certain attached "summary spaces". Furukawa and Iwamoto [9] prove
the existence of e-optimal stationary strategies for decision problems which have
multiplicative payoffs and which satisfy certain monotonicity and Lipschitz condi
tions. The multiplicative payoff is also used by Rothblum in [16].
As pointed out in [9], the multiplicative payoff often arises naturally in problems
where the objective is to maximize system reliability in a device with components
10 senes.

4. Existence of good Markov strategies in

r

The previous section established that if the objective function w lies inU' then
for any strategy there is a randomized Markov strategy with an equivalent payotI.
In this section, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate that for a large class of objective
functions within "If", it is even possible to find a f1on-randomized Markov strategy
whose payotI is at least as good as the payolf for the original strategy. For those
objective functions in 'JV which are in 'WI, the conclusions of Theorems 4.1 and
4.2 arc similar to those of theorems of Fainberg [8, Section 4]. It is assumed
throughout that (X, 1') is a countable-state decision process.
Theorem 4.1. If x
w( (r)

=

X,

E

f

f

WE

d(T

'JV', and w is of the form

for some bounded, measurable f: X'-C' ... IR,

r

then for any strategy (r A in at x there exist Markov strategies lrM afld
such that w( lrM) ~ w( lr A) ~ w( lr~,).

(4.1 )
(T~

in

r

at x

r

Proof. Suppose (TA is in
at x and wE'll". By Theorem 3.5, there is a randomized
Markov strategy a. in
at x with w(o.) = w(a A ). Using Proposition 2.4, there exists
a Markov strategy lr,\, in
at x such that

t

w(lr,\,) =

The

lr~,

f

r

f d(rM

~

f

fda. = w(o-) = w(aA)'

conclusion follows similarly.

0

It was shown earlier (Theorem 3.5) that if w::1'/, -+ IR is in 'Jr, then for any strategy
0- with w(o-) = w(a). By imposing some

a there is a randomi:ed Markov strategy

convexity restrictions, the following key theorem is obtained, which asserts the

existence of good non-randomized Markov strategies. (Of course, by enlarging the
state space sufficiently, any problem can be transformed into one where even good
"stationary" strategies always exist, but the essence of "stationary" and "Markov"
for the original problem is lost under the transformation.)
Theorem 4.2. Suppose rn : X -IR+ are bounded and gn : (IR+) -+ IR are cont'ex functions,
and that w:Yr -+[ -00,00) is defined by w=limsup G n, where
(i)

Gn(u) = gn( Eu[rl(X 1 )],

(ii)

Gn(u) = gn( Eu[r.(X. )],

For each x

E

X,

••• ,

E.,[rn(X n )]),

or

E(T[rl(XI)r~(X~)],... , EuL61 rj(Xj ) J).

if

sup{Gn(u):

n~l

then for any strategy u A in
in r at x such that

and u is in rat x}<oo,

r at x there is a

(non-randomized) Markov strategy

UM

Proof. Let (1'" be in r at x. By Theorem 3.5, there is a randomized Markov strategy
u in
at x such that w(u) = W«(T A ). Apply Proposition 2.2 to obtain a family {(T..,)
of Markov strategies in
at x such that for all n,

t

r

E,;[rn(X,,)] =

f [f r,,(X,,) dlT,,, JdJL{w)

and

Then by the convexity of gn and by Jensen's inequality, it follows that
G,,(a)

~

f

Gn(u... ) dJL(w)

for all n, Since sUP .... n{ Gn(a..,)} < 00, Fatou's Lemma applies, and

f

w(a)=li';l:,~pGn(cT)~li';l:,~p

f
=f

Gn(a... )dJ.L(w)

~ li';l':~p Gn(a..,) dJL(w)
w(a..,) dJL(w).

Since JL is a probability measure, the relation above guarantees that there exists
(in fact, a set of w's of positive measure) with
W(CT..,);:!= w(a) = W(CT A ).

0

W

r

X, let W(x) = sup{ W(17): 17 is in r at x}. A strategy 17Ao in at x is optimal
if W(17-\) = W(x); for e>O, 17Ao is E-optimal if W(17 Ao ) > W(x)-e. The following
corollary is immediate.
For x

E

Corollary 4.3. If the h.vpotheses of Theorem 4.2 are satisfied, then for each E > 0 and
x E X, there is a Markov E-optimal strategy in rat x. If also there is an optimal strategy
in r at x, then there exists a AJarkov optimal strategy in at x.

r

Remarks. If one replaces "Iimsup" by "sup" in the definition of W in Theorem 4.2,
the conclusion still holds; to see this, let h" = max j ", " gj' and observe that the h" are
convex and that limsup h" = lim h" = sup g".
The convexity assumption in Theorem 4.2 is not as restrictive as it might seem
at first glance; observe that all the payoffs in Example 3.2 except (f) are of this
form (in fact, in (a), (b). (d), and (e), the g" are even linear),
If the functions 8" in the statement of Theorem 4.2 are not convex, there may be
no Markov strategy 17,1\( for which w( 17,I\() ~ w( 17,,). Indeed, w( 17 A ) could be strictly
larger than the supremum of W«(TM) over Markov strategies 17M available at x, as
the next example illustrates.
Example 4.4. Let X = {a, h, c, d, r,f} and r" = r for each n, where r(e) = I and r = 0
otherwise. Let r(a)=n()(h)+~Ii(c)}, l'(h)=r(c)=r(e)=r(f)={8(d)}, and
r(d) = {Ii(e), Ii(f)}. Deline w on ':f,. by
w( (,) == {

I

if E,,[r(X,)] =~,

o

otherwise.

In the notation of Theorem 4.2, the function K": 1Il" ..... 1Il (n
gIl (YI, ... ,)/,,)

=

G

'f
l Y.\

~

3) is defined hy

= 2,I

otherwise.

Notice that g" is not convex, and that if (T A is a strategy in r at a which. satisfies
aA(h, d) = Ii(e) and a,,(c, d) = 5(f), then w(17 A ) = 1. However, for any Markov
strategy aM in r at a, E"" (X.\) = I or 0, so w( a,l\,) = O. (Of course, as Theorem 3.5
implies, there does exist a randomi:ed Markov strategy (T in P at a such that
W«(T) = I.)
Practically no condition, including the convexity of the g" 's, is necessary for the
conclusion of Theorem 4.2 to hold, as can be seen by looking at any decision process
where r(x) has only one element for each x (so there is only one strategy, and that
is even stationary) and an arbitrary payofI function.

5. Good Markov strategies for the lim inf objective
The results of the earlier sections will now be used to show that for the expected
lim inf payon, it is possible to find Markov strategies which are nearly optimal.

In the classical gambler's problem of Dubins and Savage [6], applied to the
special case of a countable-state decision process, the payoff associated with a
strategy is
Ea[limsup u(X" )],
"_,x
where u: X -.!R, the utility function, is bounded.
Sudderth [20], working from the Dubins and Savage framework, investigated the
analogous payoff
E'7[liminf u(X,,)]
n-X'

and established sufficient conditions for the existence of good stationary strategies
under such a payoff. In particular, he showed that if the state space X is finite and
r(x) is finite for each x E X, then optimal stationary strategies ex-ist. In a general
countable-state decision problem, however, good stationary strategies need not ex-ist
for the expected lim inf objective, as can be seen by examining Example 3.9.2 of
[6]. It is proved below that by allowing Markov strategies instead of only stationary
ones, ncar-optimality can be achieved.
Let (X, r) be a countable-state decision process and let u: X.-.!R be bounded.
Define W: X .-.!R by
W(x)

= supf E,,[liminf u(X,,)]:
rt

Theorem 5.1. For each
at x such (hm

F.

(T

is a strategy in

.'~'

r at x}.

> 0 and each x E X, there exists a MarkoL'

E.,.~I[liminf u(X,,)]

>

W(x) -

.'itratc~y

{T",

in

r

f-'.

,. .• '''-J

Proof. The theorem is easily reduced to the case where u is non-negative and takes
only finitely many values. Next, let x EX, F. > 0, and u have values c. < C1 < ... < (',.
Let 8 be F. or
min{(j+,-(j: l~j~/-l},

whichever is smaller. Let a be a strategy in

. .

r

at x such that

8£
360

E,,[hmlOf u(Xrt ) ] > W(x) - - .
n-G

(5.1 )

According to Lemma 1 of Sudderth [20], W(x), W(X.}, W(X 1 ),
martingale which converges a-almost surely,
a[liminf u(X,,) > liminf W(X n )]
n .. ~J.'".'

= 0,

••• IS

a super

(5.2)

" ..... :0

and
W(X)

~

E,,[liminf W(Xn )] ~ E,,[liminf u(Xn )].
"-,~

n-~

(5.3 )

Use relations (5.l) and (5.3) to obtain
E(j[liminf W(X") -liminf u(X")]
"-~
"-x

<~.
y

(5.4)

36

Then by (5.2), (5.4), and Markov's inequality,
u[liminf W(X") -liminf u(X")
"-X'
"-X'
For each m

~

<~]
> l-~.
6
6cI

(5.5)

1, let

From (5.5), the almost-sure convergence of W(x), W(X.), W(X~). ... , and the
assumption that u takes only finitely many values, there exists a positive integer N
such that
E

u(D N »

(5.6)

1--.

3cI

For each k. 1 ~ k ~ /, let

and

Bi'

= {(XI, x~, ... ) E X"':

for all n

3=

N. x"

E

Ad.

Notice that the sets {B:'} are disjoint and that

(5.7)
For each positive integer k, let

ak

be the product-dependent randomized Markov

strategy for a and the rewards '1,1" '~.k. 'J,k, ...• where each 'i.k : X

, - { II .
J,k -

A"

for j< N,
for}

3=

-+

IR is defined by
(5.8)

N.

Now define the randomized Markov strategy if in
partial history of length less than N, let

t

at x as follows: if q is a

and observe that for such q and for all}, a/q)=a1(q). Further, if q is a partial

history of length m, where m

Udq)
u(q) =

{

u.(q)

~

N, let

if q",EA k ,
if q", E

X\( k~1 A

k ).

(The definition of u( q) above is quite arbitrary in the case where q", does not lie
in any of the sets A k .) With aid of (5.8) and Proposition 3.4,

u(8;') = E,;['pi

;=N

= E,,[

,fi

r;.dXj)] = E,;~[
rj.dx;)]

= 0"(

;=N

,n

r;.k(Xj)]

;=N

8~)

for each k ~ 1. Then calculate:

~ E,,[liminf W( X,,)]
,. -•."

~

_=-:>
W(.d 3

e.

(The next-lo-Iast inequality used (5.6) and (5.7), and the last inequality used (5.1)
and (5.3).)
Finally, use the ahove sequence of inequalities together with Proposition 2.4 to
ohtain a (non-randomized) Markov strategy (T/\t in at x which satislics the desired
relation. 0

r

If the state space X is finite, the conclusion of Theorem 5.1 is a special case of
a result of Hill [10], who showed that if the functionj' in (4.1) is both shift-invariant
and permutation-invariant, then good Markov strategies exist.
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